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BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
George Clemon Freeman HII*
This article surveys major developments between May, 1991 and
June 1, 1992 that affect business and corporate law in Virginia.
Part I discusses major decisions in United States courts. Part II
reviews major decisions in Virginia courts. Part III summarizes
laws enacted by the Virginia General Assembly during the 1992
Session.
In Part I, five United States Supreme Court opinions of interest
are summarized. The first opinion adopted a uniform statute of
limitations for actions brought under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).1 The second opinion
adopted a rule of standing for plaintiffs suing under section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act. Another opinion refused to adopt a uniform rule
on demand futility in federal derivative actions. The fourth is a tax
case, which held that professional fees incurred in a takeover are
not deductible. The fifth opinion established a standing rule for
civil claims brought under RICO.2
Part I also discusses two opinions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. One focused on the applicability of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to lawyers. It defined a lawyer's duty
of disclosure to third parties and established when a lawyer will be
liable as an aider and abettor of a securities fraud. The second de-
cision held that a RICO claim survives the death of the injured
party. Finally, one opinion of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held that the commencement of a
tender offer is determined by the actions of the bidder, not by a
third party's interpretation of those actions.
Part II analyzes a Virginia Supreme Court decision examining
the circumstances under which a plaintiff can sue a terminated
* Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1985, University of Virginia;
J.D., 1989, Yale University; Law Clerk to the Hon. Richard S. Arnold, U.S. Circuit Judge,
8th Circuit, 1990; Law Clerk to the Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United
States Supreme Court, 1991.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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corporation under Virginia law. That case also defined the mini-
mum requirements for holding a successor corporation liable and
established when a successor corporation has no duty to warn its
predecessor's customers. One decision from the Virginia Court of
Appeals is discussed as well. This opinion set forth a test for deter-
mining when a note will be deemed a security under the Virginia
Securities Act.3.
Part III discusses several acts of the 1992 Session of the Virginia
General Assembly. This section reviews laws (i) establishing the
rules for filing and maintaining a corporate derivative suit, (ii) cre-
ating professional limited liability corporations, (iii) allowing cor-
porations, partnerships and limited liability corporations to merge,
(iv) permitting corporate boards to create stock options and (v) de-
fining the power of a corporation's shareholders when they vote
unanimously.
I. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
A. The Supreme Court
During the October, 1990 Term, the United States Supreme
Court heard arguments in an unusually high number of cases -
four - involving federal securities law questions. Given the timing
of publication of the University of Richmond Law Review's An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law, last year's author of this section was
able to address only one of these cases. The three cases she did not
address are included in this year's survey.
1. The Statute of Limitations for Fraud Actions Brought under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
In Lampf v. Gilbertson,4 the Court adopted a uniform statute of
limitations for all securities fraud actions under section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act.5 Under the Court's holding, all private actions under
section 10(b), including actions under rule 10(b) of the Security
and Exchange Commission (the SEC), must be filed within one
year of the plaintiff's discovery of the facts constituting the alleged
violation. However, under no circumstances can an action be filed
more than three years after the alleged violation occurs.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to 527.3 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
4. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1991).
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The case arose out of the sale of several limited partnerships to
the plaintiffs. The partnerships failed, and the IRS later disal-
lowed claimed tax benefits. Several plaintiffs filed complaints in
the District Court for the District of Oregon against the law firm
that had helped organize the partnerships and had written income
tax opinion letters on them. The plaintiffs, alleged the lawyers had
violated section 10(b) and rule 10(b)(5) by inducing the investors
to purchase partnerships through misrepresentations in the offer-
ing materials.
Private parties have no explicit right to bring an action under
section 10(b); federal courts have created this right based on the
underlying purpose of the provision.' Consequently, no statute of
limitations provision exists for private actions under section 10(b).
Traditionally, when a federal cause of action had no explicit limi-
tation, courts applied the time limitation of the forum state for the
most analogous state law cause of action.7 Adhering to that tradi-
tion, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
granted summary judgment for the law firm, holding that plain-
tiffs' actions were time barred under the Oregon statute of limita-
tions for fraud. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that un-
resolved factual issues pertaining to plaintiffs' discovery of the al-
leged fraud precluded entry of summary judgment. In reaching this
ruling, the court of appeals applied Oregon's statute of limitations
for common law fraud actions. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the conflict of authority among sev-
eral of the federal courts of appeal regarding the proper statute of
limitations in causes of actions based on section 10(b).8
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, 9 the Court eschewed its
practice of borrowing analogous state limitations periods for fed-
eral causes of action having no explicit limitations periods of their
6. See, e.g., Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2779-80.
7. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-77 (1985).
8. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990). See, e.g., In re Data Access Systems Sec.
Lit., 843 F.2d 1537 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U.S.
849 (1988) (applying a uniform federal statute of limitations).O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981) (applying state blue sky statute of
limitations).
9. The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Marshall
and in part by Justice Scalia.
19921
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own."0 In the portion of the opinion not joined by Justice Scalia, a
plurality of the Court held that where a cause of action is implied
from a federal statute which also contains time limitations on ex-
plicitly created causes of action, federal courts should adopt those
limitations. Federal courts should turn to analogous state limita-
tions periods only when no similar limitations exist in the federal
statute.
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, Justice Blackmun
found that all but one of the limitations periods for express causes
of action contained in the 1934 Act and created contemporane-
ously with section 10(b) were a variation of a "one-year period af-
ter discovery combined with a three-year period of repose."" He
concluded that the one- and three-year limitations periods should
apply to actions under section 10(b). Justice Blackmun explicitly
rejected the SEC's argument 2 that the court should apply the
most liberal specific statute of limitations in the 1934 Act, which
was the five-year period provided in section 20A. This section ap-
plies to insider trading and securities fraud enforcement provisions
enacted by the 1988 amendments." The plurality opinion also re-
jected the argument that principles of equitable tolling should ap-
ply to the newly adopted limitations period.
While concurring in the result, Justice Scalia disagreed with Jus-
tice Blackmun's reasoning.4 He asserted that state limitations pe-
riods should apply when a federal statute does not specify a limita-
tion. His exception to this principle would apply where the cause
of action is implied from the statute, as it was in this case.
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter dissented. Jus-
tice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, argued that the Court had
embarked on a lawmaking task that should be carried out by Con-
gress. In his opinion, the Court's new rule rejecting the practice of
looking to analogous state statutes of limitation was not justified
by the Court's prior cases.' Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Kennedy, argued that the new rule should not apply retroactively
10. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987).
11. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780.
12. The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in this case.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1991).
14. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2783.
15. Id. at 2783-85.
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to the plaintiffs.16 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor,
stated he would apply the one-year from discovery rule, but the
three-year repose period was contrary to section 10(b)'s basic func-
tion of protecting investors from fraudulent practices in the securi-
ties market."
The Lampf decision is important because it clearly defines when
causes of action brought under section 10(b) will be time barred.
No longer will the answer depend on the particular state or federal
judicial circuit in which a plaintiff brings an action. The decision,
however, has prompted Congress to enact legislation exempting
from this rule all lawsuits filed before the date of the opinion. 8 As
this article goes to press, several district courts have struck down
this new law as unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers."9
2. Standing to Sue for Short-Swing Profits under Section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act
During the October, 1990 Term, a unanimous Supreme Court
held in Gollust v. Mendell20 that a shareholder bringing an action
under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act in order to force a party to
disgorge short-swing profits does not lose standing to prosecute the
suit, if the company's stock is exchanged for stock of a new corpo-
rate parent after commencement of the suit. In Mendell, Keith
Gollust, a shareholder in Viacom International, Inc. (Interna-
tional), filed a complaint alleging that the defendants, acting as a
single group owning more than ten percent of the common stock,
owed the corporation eleven million dollars in short-swing profits
earned in trades made between July and October of 1988. Several
months after Gollust filed suit, a shell corporation, Viacom, Inc.
(Viacom), was formed to acquire International. Viacom, in ex-
change for its stock and cash, acquired all of the International
stock. International was Viacom's only asset.
Granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
16. Id. at 2785-88.
17. Id. at 2788-90.
18. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (to be codified as Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 27A, 78aa-1).
19. See, e.g., In re Buchard Sec. Lit., No. C87-2987 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 1992).
20. 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991).
1992]
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York ruled that section 16(b) actions can be maintained only by
the issuer of the securities traded or by its shareholders.2 As a
shareholder in Viacom, Mendell could no longer maintain the suit.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the lower court's decision.2 2 It held that the statute required
that a suit to be initiated by an owner of the harmed corporation's
stock, but contained no language requiring the plaintiff to main-
tain ownership throughout the suit. The court also stated that
under the facts of this case, implying such a requirement would
not be consistent with the statute's remedial purpose.23 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the con-
flict between the Second Circuit and other federal courts of
appeal. 24
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, affirmed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision. Following the lower court's reasoning, Justice Sou-
ter noted that the statutory language requires a plaintiff bringing
an action under section 16(b) to "own a security of the issuer at
the time the . . . action is instituted. ' 25 Although the statute
clearly does not include parents or subsidiaries as "issuers," Jus-
tice Souter found nothing in the statute or legislative history indi-
cating Congress wished to require a plaintiff to maintain continu-
ous ownership during the lawsuit.
In dicta, Justice Souter noted that while there is no continuous
ownership requirement, Congress clearly intended that anyone
maintaining a section 16(b) action have a continuous financial in-
terest in the action's outcome." He also noted that a continuous
financial interest is probably needed to confer standing on a plain-
tiff under Article, III of the Constitution. In this case, standing
existed because Gollust had an ongoing interest in the parent cor-
poration that owned the allegedly harmed securities.
As Justice Souter's dicta illustrates, the Court's holding in
Mendell is somewhat limited. Only in rare factual situations would
21. Mendell v. Gollust, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
22. Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990).
23. Id. at 730.
24. See Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979); Roth-
enberg v. United Brands Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,045 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd mem.
573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977).
25. Gollust, 111 S. Ct. at 2179.
26. Id. at 2080-81.
27. Id. at 2080.
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a plaintiff who had been a security holder of the issuer somehow
become divested of that interest while still maintaining a financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation.
3. Demand Excused in Federal Derivative Suits
While the Supreme Court seemed to be further federalizing se-
curities litigation issues in Lampf v. Gilbertson, in Kamen v. Kern-
per Financial Services, Inc., it declined to federalize one aspect of
federal securities laws controlled by state law.28 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Marshall rejected a uniform federal rule
that shareholders must make a demand on a corporation's board
before filing a derivative suit based on federal securities law.
Jill Kamen filed a derivative action in federal district court
against the fund's investment advisor. Kamen did not make a de-
mand on the fund's board because she believed it would have been
futile. Upon the defendant's motion, the district court dismissed
the action on the grounds that Kamen had failed to plead facts
sufficient to excuse her failure to make a demand upon the board.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismis-
sal of Kamen's claim,29 because under federal common law, a
plaintiff must always make a demand before filing a derivative suit
alleging violation of a federal law.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari"0 and reversed.3 1 Writing
for the Court, Justice Marshall restated the principle that federal
courts should look to state law as the rule of decision, unless such
an application would frustrate the specific objectives of the federal
statute at issue.2 Justice Marshall elaborated on this general rule,
stating the presumption of applying state procedural law is partic-
ularly strong where the parties have entered into legal relation-
ships expecting their rights to be governed by state law. He con-
cluded that corporate law was one such area because corporations
are created and exist under state law.
28. 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
29. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990).
30. 111 S. Ct. 554 (1990).
31. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1711.
32. Id. at 1717 (citations omitted) (noting that the issue of the demand required by the
Investment Company Act was a federal question).
33. Id.
1992] 659
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Applying these principles to the facts of Kamen, Justice Mar-
shall found that the demand requirement relates to the issue of
corporate governance since the requirement potentially limits di-
rectors' power to control corporate litigation. 4 Under many states'
laws, demand is considered futile when a majority of directors have
approved the alleged improper act. The court concluded, therefore,
that a federal rule of universal demand would bolster the power of
directors at shareholders' expense.35 Finally, Justice Marshall
noted that the futility exception was not inconsistent with the ba-
sic policies of the Investment Company Act.36
4. Professional Fees Incurred in a Friendly Acquisition Are Not
Deductible
In the October, 1991, Term, the Supreme Court decided a tax
case that could affect corporate acquisitions. In Indopco, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,37 a unanimous Court held that
expenses for professional charges incurred during a corporation's
friendly acquisition by another corporation are not deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code.38
5. Standing to Sue Under Civil RICO
In another case from the 1991 Term, Holmes v. Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corp.,39 the Supreme Court held that for a plaintiff
to bring suit under the civil provisions of RICO, he must show a
direct relationship between the predicate offense and the alleged
injury. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the
federal circuit courts of appeals regarding whether the rule of Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,40 which established that only
a purchaser or seller of the affected securities can sue under sec-
34. Id. at 1719.
35. Id. at 1720.
36. Id. at 1722.
37. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
38. 26 U.S.C. 9 162(a) (1988). Specifically, the Court held that simply because expendi-
tures did not "create or enhance . . . a separate and distinct additional asset" does not
mean that they are not capital in nature and deductible under § 162. 112 S. Ct. at 1046.
39. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
40. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that plaintiff must have purchased or sold securities at
issue to bring a private action under § 10(b)).
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tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act, applies to a RICO claim predicated on
violations of section 10(b).4
In July, 1981, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) sought decrees in federal district courts to protect the cus-
tomers of two broker-dealers. The district courts issued the decrees
and appointed trustees to liquidate each broker-dealer. 42 In 1983,
SIPC and the two trustees filed suit against seventy-five defend-
ants in the District Court for the Middle District of California.
The plaintiffs alleged the defendants had conspired to manipulate
the stock of six companies and had caused two broker-dealers to
collapse, thereby harming the broker-dealers' customers. 43 The
customers had not, however, purchased any of the manipulated
stock. Plaintiffs also sought treble damages under RICO arguing
the defendants' acts were part of a pattern of racketeering
activity.44
After five years of litigation, the district court granted summary
judgment for one defendant, Robert Holmes. The court held that
plaintiffs did not have standing as purchasers or sellers to bring
the securities fraud claim on which the RICO claim was predi-
cated, and that plaintiffs failed to establish that Holmes' actions
had proximately caused the customers' injuries.45
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that a RICO claim based on securities fraud was not subject to the
standing requirements applicable to section 10(b) claims. 46 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue.47
41. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have held that only a purchaser or seller of securities
can bring a RICO action predicated on violations of § 10(b). International Data Bank, Ltd.
v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987); Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir.
1986). The Ninth and' Eleventh Circuits have held that the § 10(b) standing requirement is
not applicable to a RICO claim predicated on violations of § 10(b). Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990); Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co.,
828 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).
42. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1314. The SIPC is a private non-profit corporation formed by
the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
One of the SIPC's primary functions is to protect customers of member broker-dealers.
Most broker-dealers registered under § 15(b) of the 1934 Act are required to be members of
SIPC. See id.
43. Holmes, 112, S. Ct. at 1315.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
47. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1990).
1992]
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In an opinion written by Justice Souter,"4 the Court held that
under RICO a plaintiff must show the defendant's alleged violation
proximately caused the harm entitling that plaintiff to relief. The
Justice began by observing that the relevant parts of RICO are
based on the same language found in section 7 of the Sherman
Act 49 and section 4 of the Clayton Act.5 0 Years ago, courts deter-
mined that plaintiffs bringing an action under either of those stat-
utes must show the defendant's violation proximately caused the
plaintiff's injury. Justice Souter reasoned, therefore, that Congress
must have intended to incorporate this proximate cause require-
ment into RICO.51
The plaintiffs argued they were entitled to recover from Holmes
because they were subrogated to the rights of the broker-dealers'
customers and because SIPC had an independent right to sue
Holmes for funds advanced to SIPC trustees.52 Addressing the first
theory, the court found that no proximate cause existed between
the violation alleged, stock manipulation, and the harm suffered by
the customers of the bankrupt broker-dealers. Justice Souter
stated the causal chain was indirect and purely contingent on the
harm suffered by the broker-dealers. 3 The plaintiffs' second the-
ory was also rejected since the Court found no statutory authoriza-
tion for SIPC to maintain a suit to recover damages from
Holmes.5 4 Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. 55
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Stevens, wrote a
separate concurring opinion. Although Justice O'Connor agreed
proximate cause must be proven to establish RICO violations, she
emphasized that the Court should have addressed the issue on
which it granted certiorari. She also explained that, in her opinion,
a plaintiff need not be a purchaser or seller of securities to assert
RICO claims based on securities fraud. 6 Justice Scalia also wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the Court
48. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice
Souter in the majority opinion.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317.
51. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317-18.
52. Id. at 1319.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1321.
55. Id. at 1322.
56. Id. at 1322-27.
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should address the issue on which certiorari was granted. He stated
he would have resolved that issue the same way Justice O'Connor
did, but for different reasons.5"
As Justice Souter pointed out in the majority opinion, the proxi-
mate cause requirement will resolve many cases in which the ques-
tion of the applicability of section 10(b)'s seller/purchaser require-
ment to RICO claims would arise. However, a split still exists
among the circuit courts on this issue. Should the question present
itself in a case where the plaintiff could satisfy the proximate cause
requirement, it could easily reach the Supreme Court. Further-
more, each of the four Justices who has stated a view has indicated
an intent to vote contrary to the Fourth Circuit's current position.
B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
1. Disclosure of a Lawyer's Duties Under Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act
In Shatz v. Rosenberg,58 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that a law firm cannot be held liable under
section 10(b) for failing to disclose information about a client to a
third party, in the absence of a fiduciary or other confidential rela-
tionship with that third party. The litigation stemmed from the
sale by Ivan and Joanne Shatz of their controlling interest in two
corporations in exchange for a promissory note issued by MER En-
terprises (MER) and personally guaranteed by Mark Rosenberg.5
Before closing the sale, Rosenberg showed Mr. and Mrs. Shatz
false financial statements and his attorneys delivered an updated
letter from him stating that his net worth exceeded seven million
dollars. In reality, Rosenberg was on the verge of bankruptcy.
Several months later, when they had still not received payment
on the promissory note, and after making a $150,000 bridge loan to
another company owned by Rosenberg, the Shatzes sued Rosen-
berg, MER, and its counsel, the law firm of Weinberg & Green.
The plaintiff alleged the defendants had violated federal securities
laws and had committed common law fraud.60 The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed all of the
57. Id. at 1327.
58. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
59. Id. at 487-88.
60. Id. at 488.
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).6 Mr. and
Mrs. Shatz appealed only the claims filed against the law firm.
On appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Shatz argued that the law firm violated
section 10(b) by failing to disclose Rosenberg's misrepresentations
in the financial statements and by knowingly misrepresenting his
financial condition.2 Acknowledging that one must have a duty to
disclose under section 10(b) to be held liable for failing to disclose,
the Shatzes maintained that a law firm has such a duty. According
to their theory, this duty exists when a firm deliberately dissemi-
nates false information it knows to be false with the intention or
knowledge that the information will be relied upon by a third
party in connection with a sale of securities. The Shatzes also as-
serted that a law firm has a duty to disclose under state rules of
professional conduct and as a general matter of public policy. 3
Addressing the first theory, the Fourth Circuit held that unless a
lawyer makes active misrepresentations in the solicitation of a sale
of securities, he has no duty to disclose information to a third
party, absent a relationship of confidence and trust with that
party.6 4 The court also rejected the Shatzes's second theory, rea-
soning that while the attorneys had an ethical duty to disclose
under the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, such a duty
did not create a legal duty, in the absence of an attorney-client
relationship. 5 Finally, the court rejected the public policy theory
of liability on the grounds that imposing a duty to disclose under
these facts would actually harm the public.6 The court believed
the plaintiff's proposed disclosure rule would encourage both cli-
ents and their attorneys to avoid learning all of the facts in a par-
ticular controversy. Holding attorneys liable is more likely to make
them unknowing accomplices to securities law violations than to
make them society's watchdogs. Under the rule adopted by the
court, however, "the client is more likely to disclose damaging or
problematic information [to counsel], and the lawyer will more
likely be able to counsel his client against misconduct." 7
61. FED R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 943 F.2d at 488-89.
62. 943 F.2d at 490.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 490-92.
65. Id. at 492.
66. Id. at 493-94.
67. Id. at 493. See also Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990).
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The Shatzes's second argument was that the law firm violated
section 10(b) by making affirmative misrepresentations when it de-
livered the letter misrepresenting Rosenberg's financial status and
when it drafted closing documents attesting that Rosenberg's fi-
nancial statements were true and correct. 8 The Fourth Circuit
found that the law firm did not make any affirmative misrepresen-
tation merely because it forwarded the letter from Rosenberg. The
court also noted that the provisions in closing documents had been
decided earlier by the parties and the attorneys had simply had
recorded the terms of the deal. Under these facts, the firm's trans-
mission of Rosenberg's misrepresentations did not transform them
into its own.69
The essence of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Shatz is that a
lawyer has no duty to disclose a client's misdoings to unrelated
third parties in the absence of an independent duty to that party.
As many lawyers are aware, this issue has attracted much attention
recently, particularly with regard to attorneys who represent failed
savings and loan institutions. It is an issue where the boundaries of
liability may be shifting. The court's reasoning in this case may
provide guidance for attorneys in areas of the law where a lawyer's
duty to disclose is less clear.
2. Aider and Abettor Liability under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act
In Shatz v. Rosenberg, the plaintiffs also argued that the law
firm was liable under section 10(b) and section 12(d) of the 1934
Act for aiding and abetting Rosenberg's violations. 70 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument because Mr. and Mrs. Shatz had
failed to allege in their complaint the scienter requirement for
aider and abettor liability. Under section 10(b), absent a duty
owed by the aider and abettor to the injured party, the aider and
abettor must possess a "high[ly] conscious intent" and a "con-
scious and specific motivation" to aid the fraud to be liable.7' In
their pleadings, the Shatzes had merely asserted that the attorneys
knowingly and/or recklessly had provided substantial assistance to
68. 943 F.2d at 494.
69. Id. at 495.
70. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 496.
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Rosenberg's fraud. Consequently, they did not properly plead their
aider and abettor claim.72
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit held the Shatzes failed to prop-
erly plead an aider and abettor claim because the complaint con-
tained no allegations that the attorneys had substantially assisted
Rosenberg in perpetrating the fraud. 3 The Shatzes argued the at-
torneys assisted Rosenberg by failing to disclose his real financial
condition and by participating in negotiations and in the closing.
In what appears to be the first time a federal court of appeals has
decided the issue, the Fourth Circuit held that absent a duty to
disclose, an allegation that the defendants knew of a wrongdoing,
but failed to act, does not state an aiding and abetting claim.74
The court went on to explain that while aider and abettor liabil-
ity may be predicated on an attorney's active participation in a
transaction (i.e., soliciting sales or negotiating terms), where a law-
yer merely acts as a scrivener liability cannot be imposed without
alleging a conscious intent to violate the securities laws. 5 Other-
wise the court would be essentially creating a per se rule, holding
attorneys liable in every securities fraud case because the attorneys
almost always draft closing documents. Since the Shatzes had al-
leged the attorneys had not intended to violate the 1934 Act, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the aider and abettor claims under
this theory also.7 6
3. Civil RICO Claims Survive the Plaintiff's Death
The Fourth Circuit, in a case of first impression for the federal
courts of appeal, held that a civil RICO claim survives the death of
the plaintiff. In Faircloth v. Finesod,7 the controversy arose out of
the sale of art reproductions78 based on phony appraisals of each
reproduction's worth and an attorney's fraudulent opinion letter
stating that the reproduction was a viable tax shelter. Phyllis Fair-
cloth, the administrator of the estate of a purchaser of one of the
reproductions, brought suit against the seller, the appraisers, and
72. Id. at 496-97.
73. Id. at 497.
74. Id. at 496-97.
75. Id. at 497.
76. The court also dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. Id. at 497-98.
77. 938 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1991).
78. The reproductions were art masters from which prints and posters could be made. Id.
at 514.
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others alleging fraud, securities law violations and unfair trade
practices. She also sought treble damages under RICO. After four
years of litigation, a jury awarded Faircloth damages, which, after
trebling, totaled over four million dollars. One defendant appealed,
arguing that the district court erred in holding that civil RICO
claims survive the plaintiff." The Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court on one issue, but upheld the award of damages under
RICO. Reasoning that Congress had declared civil RICO to be a
remedial statute which should be liberally construed, the Fourth
Circuit announced that civil RICO claims survive the death of the
injured party.80
D. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia
1. Commencement of a Tender Offer
In Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System,81 the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held that a press release describing
a corporate restructuring, of which one part would be a tender of-
fer, did not commence a tender offer under section 14(d)(7) of the
Williams Act.82 The basis of the decision was that the press release
was not issued by the bidder and did not identify the bidder.8
The plaintiffs brought suit against the various parties involved
in the sale of RF&P Corporation's (RF&P) assets. The complaint
alleged the defendants had violated section 14(d)(7) of the Wil-
liams Act and SEC Rules 14d-10 and 10b-13 by purchasing stock
from two stockholders at a price per share in excess of that speci-
fied in the tender offer. 4 Both purchases occurred after RF&P had
publicly announced it would restructure itself in three steps, one of
which was a tender offer. Significantly, this announcement did not
identify the party that would be making the tender offer.
On the defendants' motion, the district court dismissed the ac-
tion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
79. Id. at 515-16.
80. Id. at 518.
81. 783 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Va. 1992).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1981).
83. Kahn, 783 F. Supp. at 271.
84. Both purchases occurred after the announcement of restructuring, which the plaintiffs
argued commenced, the tender offer for purposes of § 14(d)(7). 783 F. Supp. at 270.
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court held that, as a matter of law, both purchases at issue were
not made during a tender offer."5 Addressing the allegation that
RF&P's press release commenced the tender offer, the court stated
it had not because the release did not state it was a tender offer
and did not identify the bidder. It was deemed irrelevant that the
press had surmised the identity of bidder, as long as the bidder did
not positively affirm the information in the newspapers. To deter-
mine whether a tender offer has commenced, "[t]he Court looks
solely to the official actions of the tender offer bidder."8
II. VIRGINIA COURTS
A. The Virginia Supreme Court
In Harris v. T.L, Inc.,87 the Virginia Supreme Court made sev-
eral rulings of first impression which are important to corporate
acquisitions. The case arose from a garbage truck backing over and
killing a blind woman. The truck was not equipped with a device
to sound an alarm when the truck was placed in reverse. Truxmore
Industries manufactured the vehicle and sold it to the owner in
1981. In 1985, Truxmore Industries sold all of its assets to a corpo-
ration, Truxmore, which held itself out to be the ongoing concern
of Truxmore Industries. As part of the sale agreement, Truxmore
Industries, the seller, changed its name to T.I., Inc. (T.I.). One year
later, T.I. filed Articles of Dissolution and Articles of Termination
with the Virginia State Corporation Commission.8
Richard Harris, the executor of the decedent's estate, brought a
products liability action against the dissolved T.I. and its succes-
sor, Truxmore. The trial court sustained both T.I's and
Truxmore's demurrers and dismissed the action. The Virginia Su-
preme Court granted Harris's petition for appeal.8
1. Claims Against the Terminated Corporation
Before the Virginia Supreme Court, Harris first challenged the
trial court's ruling that he had no right of action against T.I. be-
cause the claim arose after the date of T.I.'s termination. Harris
85. Id. at 274.
86. Id. at 271.
87. 243 Va. 63, 413 S.E.2d 605 (1992).
88. Id. at 65-67, 413 S.E.2d at 606-07.
89. Id. at 65, 413 S.E.2d at 606.
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argued that under section 13.1-755 of the Virginia Code (the
Code), T.I. remained liable for any defective product sold before
the termination date." Section 13.1-755 provides in part: "[t]he
termination of corporate existence shall not take away or impair
any remedy available to or against the corporation . .. for any
right or claim existing or any liability incurred, prior to such termi-
nation." 91 Harris asserted that "liability" includes future and con-
tingent liability and, therefore, a product's liability is incurred at
the time of sale.92
The court rejected Harris's interpretation of "liability" under
section 13.1-755. The court noted that section 13.1-755 altered the
common law rule that a terminated corporation could not be sued.
Therefore, as with any statute changing the common law, section
13.1-755 must be strictly construed. Applying that rule of construc-
tion, the court held that "liability" means only an actual liability
existing at the time of termination. The court concluded that there
were no claims existing against or liabilities incurred by T.I. when
it terminated. Therefore, Harris could not bring any claim against
T.I.93
2. Liability as a Successor Corporation
Harris also argued that the trial court erred in sustaining
Truxmore's demurrer because the defendant was liable as the suc-
cessor of Truxmore Industries. Under Virginia law, a purchasing
corporation will be liable for the obligations of its predecessor only
if: (i) the purchaser expressly or implicitly agreed to assume such
liabilities; (ii) the transaction was a consolidation or de facto
merger of the two corporations; (iii) the transaction was fraudu-
lent; or (iv) the purchaser was merely a continuation of the seller
corporation.9 4 The court found that Truxmore had not assumed
the product liabilities of its predecessor. The Virginia Supreme
Court also decided Harris had not alleged the existence of fraud or
a de facto merger.95
90. Id. at 67-68, 413 S.E.2d at 607-08.
91. Id. at 67, 413 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-755 (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
92. Id. at 68, 413 S.E.2d at 608.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 70, 413 S.E.2d at 609.
95. Id. at 69-70, 413 S.E.2d at 608-09.
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Arguing that Truxmore was a mere continuation of Truxmore
Industries, Harris asserted that Truxmore continued the same op-
erations at the same location with the same personnel as Truxmore
Industries. The successor also had actively tried to keep the same
customers. The court, however, held that these factors were not
sufficient. Instead, the court indicated that to state a claim under
the mere continuation exception to the rule against successor cor-
porate liability, a plaintiff must at least allege a "common iden-
tity" of officers, directors, and shareholders between the two com-
panies or allege that the transaction was not made at arms
length 6
3. No Duty of Successor Corporation to Warn Predecessor's Cus-
tomers in Absence of Service Arrangement
Harris's final argument against the trial court sustaining
Truxmore's demurrer was that, as a matter of law, Truxmore had
an independent duty to warn the truck owner of the dangers of not
having a back-up sounding device.9 7 In support of this position,
Harris demonstrated that at the time of the accident industry
standards mandated such devices in all new trucks. Harris also al-
leged that Truxmore representatives contacted the owner to in-
form him that business would continue as usual and before the ac-
cident, attempted to sell him a new truck. In addition, the owner
bought replacement parts for the truck involved in the accident
from Truxmore's Richmond plant, the only source of such parts.98
The Virginia Supreme Court again upheld the trial court. As-
suming, without deciding, that successor corporations could have a
duty to warn customers who had purchased products from the
predecessor, the court analyzed the law in those jurisdictions rec-
ognizing such a duty. The court stated that these jurisdictions have
"looked to whether there was a direct and continuing relationship
between the successor and the predecessor's customers." 99 Most of
these jurisdictions have required, at a minimum, that the successor
owe a current service obligation to the customer or that the succes-
sor have serviced the product. In this case, the facts alleged
showed nothing more than "casual contact" between the truck
96. Id. at 70-71, 413 S.E.2d at 609.
97. Id. at 71, 413 S.E.2d at 610.
98. Id. at 71, 413 S.E.2d at 610.
99. Id. at 72, 413 S.E.2d at 610.
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owner and Truxmore. Therefore, the court concluded, even if a
successor corporation has a duty to warn its predecessor's custom-
ers of product defects, no such duty existed in this case.100
B. The Virginia Court of Appeals
1. Definition of a Security Under the Virginia Securities Act
In Ascher v. Commonwealth,'0 1 the Virginia Court of Appeals
adopted a broad definition of a security under the Virginia securi-
ties act. 02 Drawing an analogy to the federal securities acts, the
court of appeals essentially adopted the federal definition of a se-
curity spelled out by the United States Supreme Court in Reves v.
Ernst & Young.' 0s
Ascher began when the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to in-
dict Rochelle Ascher "on eleven counts of securities fraud in viola-
tion of the Virginia Securities Act" and one count of "conspiracy
to commit securities fraud" for her involvement in soliciting loans
for Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.'s political organization, the National
Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC). °4 The loans were evidenced
by promissory notes. A jury convicted Ascher on eight counts of
securities fraud and one conspiracy count. The Virginia Court of
Appeals granted her an appeal on six assignments of error. 0 5
In one assignment of error, Ascher argued that the jury had not
been adequately instructed on the definition of a security, and
therefore lacked the standard needed to determine whether the
promissory notes at issue were securities under the Virginia Securi-
ties Act. The Court of Appeals rejected her argument, finding the
instruction to be a "correct statement of the law" and concluding
100. Id.
101. 12 Va. App. 1105, 408 S.E.2d 906 (1991).
102. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to -527.3 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
103. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
104. Ascher, 12 Va. App. at 1107-08, 408 S.E.2d at 908-09. Ascher had been in charge of
NCLC's phone solicitation team operating out of Baltimore, Maryland. The NCLC fund
raisers called people on the telephone and asked them to make donations. When the fund
raisers could not solicit a contribution from an individual, they would ask the person for a
loan, promising a higher interest rate than those offered by banks. If the person agreed to
make a loan, NCLC would immediately send a courier over to the person to receive the
check and give the lender a promissory note. By 1984, Ascher was aware that NCLC was
only selectively paying back the loans, but she continued to solicit loans through 1986, while
still representing to lenders that the organization always paid back its loans. Id at 1108-11,
408 S.E.2d at 909-11.
105. Id. at 1108, 1112, 408 S.E.2d at 909, 911.
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that the "instruction was adequate because, on the[] facts [of the
case], there [was] no context in which the jury could have found
the notes at issue not to have been securities."' 0 6
In reaching this latter conclusion, the court adopted the test
used by the United States Supreme Court in Reves10 7 for deter-
mining when a note is a security under the federal securities acts.
Under the test adopted by the Virginia Court of Appeals, a prom-
issory note is presumed to be a security and "'th[is] presumption
may be rebutted only by a showing that the note at issue bears a
strong resemblance . . . to one of the enumerated categories of in-
strument' which the [United States Supreme] Court declared were
notes that did not have the character of a security."'1 8 If the note
at issue does not resemble one of the instruments not considered a
security, then "the court must consider and decide whether the
note may fall within a broader definition of a promissory note that
is not a security."' 0 9 Under this broader definition, a court must
consider four factors. The first factor is the motivation of the par-
ties to the transaction: if the note originator's motivation is to raise
operational capital and the buyer's motivation is profit, the instru-
ment probably is a security." 0 The second factor to be considered
is the extent of the note's planned distribution: if notes are offered
to a "broad segment of the public," then they are more likely to be
securities. The third factor to be considered is the public's percep-
tion of the note: if the public perceives it as an investment, the
note is a security."' The fourth and final factor is the presence of a
" 'regulatory scheme' applicable to the transaction or instrument
which would 'significantly' reduce the risk to the buyer or to the
public . . . if the securities act did not control.""' 2 In the absence
of an alternative regulatory scheme, a court will be more inclined
to find that a note is a security.
106. Id. at 1121, 408 S.E.2d at 915-17.
107. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-67.
108. Ascher, 12 Va. App. at 1122, 408 S.E.2d at 917 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 67). The
Ascher court listed examples of notes "which are generally non-securities," including con-
sumer financing notes and "note[s] secured by [a] mortgage on a home." Id. at 1123, 403
S.E.2d at 917 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 65).
109. Id. at 1123, 403 S.E.2d at 918.
110. Id. (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 66).
111. Id. at 1124, 408 S.E.2d at 918 (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 68-69).
112. Id.
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Applying these elements to the facts of the case,113 the court
found that each one favored defining the notes as securities. Con-
sequently, it held there was no evidence upon which a juror could
have found Ascher was able to rebut the presumption that the
notes were securities.1 4 The court also rejected Ascher's other five
points of error and affirmed her convictions.
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Shareholder Derivative Actions
The Virginia General Assembly has enacted a new law that
amends the definition of a shareholder derivative suit in section
13.1-603 of the Code and eliminates the old provisions of section
13.1-672, substituting new provisions.115 These new provisions,
codified as sections 13.1-672.1 through 13.1-672.5, establish the
ground rules for filing and maintaining derivative lawsuits and are
far more specific than those they replaced. Clearly, these new rules
are less favorable to plaintiffs than their predecessors.
The new provisions require that any plaintiff filing a derivative
suit first must have made a written demand upon the board of di-
rectors to take "suitable" action. There are no exceptions to this
demand requirement."' After submitting this demand, the share-
holder-plaintiff must then wait for ninety days to pass before filing
the action unless the demand is rejected in the interim or "irrepa-
rable injury to the corporation would result by waiting until the
end of the ninety-day period.""'1 If a corporation has begun evalu-
ating allegations in a shareholder's demand, the new law also al-
lows a court to stay a derivative suit for a period deemed appropri-
ate by that court." 8
The new law retains the same requirements regarding court ap-
proval of derivative suit settlements."' It does, however, add a new
paragraph providing that if a derivative action against a foreign
113. Ascher did not argue that the notes were similar to one of the enumerated non-
securities. Id.
114. Id. at 1126, 408 S.E.2d at 918-19.
115. See Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 802, 1992 Va. Acts 1270 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
13.1-603, 13.1-672.1 to -672.5 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1992). Some other jurisdictions, how-
ever, excuse demand if such demand would be futile.
117. Id. § 13.1-672.1(B)(2).
118. Id. § 13.1-672.1(C).
119. Id. § 13.1-672.2.
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corporation is brought in Virginia, the issues of standing and
grounds for dismissal shall be governed by the laws of that corpo-
ration's state of incorporation. 120
In addition, the statute establishes the grounds upon which a
derivative action may be dismissed by a court.12' Under these new
provisions, a court must dismiss a derivative action if one of the
approved groups (discussed below) has (i) conducted an adequately
informed review and evaluation of the allegations; (ii) determined
in good faith from this review and evaluation that maintenance of
the action is not in the corporation's best interest; and (iii) has
submitted a short statement of the reasons for its determination
and such determination is not unreasonable.' 22
Unless a court appoints an independent panel upon the motion
of the corporation's board, the review of allegations and determi-
nation shall be made by a majority of the independent directors or
by a majority of a committee consisting of at least two indepen-
dent directors appointed by a majority of the independent direc-
tors. 2 ' The new provisions also give some standard for determin-
ing if a director is independent. 24 Section 13.1-672.4(C) provides
that:
None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be consid-
ered not independent for purposes of this section:
1. The nomination or election of the director by persons who are
defendants in the derivative proceeding or against whom action is
demanded;
2. The naming of a director as a defendant in a derivative pro-
ceeding or as a person against whom action is demanded; or
3. The approval by the director of the act being challenged in the
derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in no personal
benefit to the director.
If a shareholder brings a derivative suit after a shareholder's de-
mands have been rejected, the statute requires the plaintiff to al-
120. Id. § 13.1-672.3.
121. Id. § 13.1-672.4.
122. Id. § 13.1-672.4(A).
123. Id. § 13.1-672.4(B).
124. Id. § 13.1-672.4(C).
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lege with particularity that the conditions for dismissal125 have not
been met.12 6 A plaintiff is then "entitled to discovery with respect
to the issues presented by the motion only if and to the extent that
the complaint alleges such facts with particularity.' 27 The statute
now clearly places the burden of proving that the grounds for dis-
missal have not been met on the plaintiff, although the corporation
will have to prove issues of director independence "if the com-
plaint alleges with particularity facts raising a substantial question
as to such independence."' 28
Finally, the new provisions require that at the termination of a
derivative action, a court must award costs to the plaintiff if it
finds the action has benefitted the corporation. 12 9 Even more note-
worthy, the statute provides that a court shall direct the plaintiff
to pay the defendant's expenses and legal fees if it finds the action
was "commenced or maintained without reasonable cause."' 30 A
court may also, at any time during a derivative suit, "require the
plaintiff to furnish security for the payment of expenses for which
that plaintiff may become liable.' 3'
B. Limited Liability Companies
The Virginia General Assembly also added Chapter 13 to the
Code, the Professional Limited Liability Company Act, 3 2 which al-
lows professional or business entities which were formed to provide
professional services to organize as a limited liability company for
the purpose of rendering the same type of professional services. 133
The act provides background rules of organization and manage-
ment. Under its terms, professional limited liability companies are
also subject to Chapter 12, the Virginia Limited Liability Company
Act,' but Chapter 13 controls in the event the two chapters
conflict. 35
125. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.4(D) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 13.1-672.4(E).
129. Id. § 13.1-672.5(A)(1).
130. Id. § 13.1-672.5(A)(2).
131. Id. § 13.1-672.5(B).
132. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 574, 1992 Va. Acts 738 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
1100 to -1123 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1101 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
134. Id. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073.
135. Id. § 13.1-1122.
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Another act amended portions of the Virginia Limited Liability
Company Act, the Virginia Stock Corporation Act,136 and the Vir-
ginia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 3 7 to allow corpo-
rations, limited partnerships and limited liability companies to
merge.'3 8 The one major limitation to these mergers is that when-
ever a limited partnership merges with a corporation, domestic or
foreign, or a limited liability company, domestic or foreign, the
limited partnership cannot be the surviving entity. 9 The new leg-
islation also establishes procedures for carrying out these mergers
and essentially tracks the merger provisions for corporations pres-
ently contained in the Virginia Stock Corporation Act.
C. Corporate Board's Power to Create Stock Options
The General Assembly also amended the Virginia Stock Corpo-
ration Act as it applies to the power of a corporation's board of
directors to create options or warrants to purchase shares of the
corporation without shareholder approval.'40 Under section 13.1-
646 of the Code as amended, the board of directors has the power,
subject to the shareholder preemption provisions of section 13.1-
651, to create "rights, options or warrants for the purchase of
shares of the corporation," unless such power is specifically re-
served to the shareholders in the articles of incorporation.' 4 ' The
board is also empowered with the ability to decide the terms of,
compensation for, or restrictions on, these plans. 42 In addition,
any actions taken by the board in regard to such plans are to be
judged by the business-judgment rule described in section 13.1-
690.143
D. Shareholder Power
Another amendment, affecting both the Stock Corporation Act
and the Nonstock Corporation Act, provides that actions taken by
136. Id. §§ 13.1-603 to -780 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cur. Supp. 1992).
137. Id. §§ 50-73.1 to -73.77.
138. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 575, 1992 Va. Acts 754 (codified primarily at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-1070 to -1073, 50-73.48:1 to -73.48:4, 50-73.57:2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
139. See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.48:1(A)(6)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
140. Act of Mar. 26, 1992, ch. 472, 1992 Va. Acts 605 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
646 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.48:1(A)(6) (Cur. Supp. 1992).
142. Id. § 13.1-646(B).
143. Id.
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the unanimous consent of shareholders (or members of non-stock
corporations) do not need further approval by the corporation's di-
rectors.14 4 Although this power of shareholders voting as a group is
an inherent right of the owners of such corporation, the General
Assembly has chosen to make this power absolutely clear by enact-
ing the provision into the Code.
144. Id. §§ 13.1-688, -868.
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